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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In August 2000, an old, industrial brownfield lot at Kendall Square 
in Cambridge, Massachusetts began a transformation. Rising above the 
site, a LEED1 certified platinum building now sits, housing the corporate 
headquarters of Genzyme. This new building is part of a larger urban 
revitalization project for the Kendall Square neighborhood.2 The trend is 
not limited to Cambridge. Across the country, in Portland, Oregon, 409 
blighted acres of former industrial and commercial shipping business 
along the south waterfront are transformed into a green, urban 
neighborhood.3 The revitalized neighborhood, and former brownfield, is 
reconnected to the city center.  
 Brownfields are “real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or 
reuse of which may be complicated by the presence of a hazardous 
substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”4 Cleanup and reuse of brownfields 
“protects the environment, reduces blight, and takes development pressure 
off greenspaces and working lands.”5 Residential property values can 
increase between 5-12.8 percent after brownfields cleanup.6 Additionally, 
many brownfields are located within existing infrastructure, promoting 
urban revitalization in a cost-effective manner.7 Brownfield cleanup and 
redevelopment contributes to job growth and an increased tax base, 
combats crime, and reduces pollution.8  It is estimated that there are more 
than 450,000 brownfield sites in the United States.9 
 In 2002, the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act (the “Brownfield Amendments”) was enacted. The 
stated purpose of the Act was to “provide relief … from liability under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act [CERCLA] of 1980, and to amend such act to promote the cleanup 
                                                 
1. Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design, U.S. GREEN BLDG. COUNCIL, 
www.usgbc.org/leed (last visited Apr. 12, 2014). 
2. Genzyme Center: Innovative Building for an Innovative Co., GENZYME CENTER, 
www.genzymecenter.com/pdf/genzctr_background.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2014). 
3. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 560-F-12-013: BROWNFIELDS at a GLANCE 
(2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/success/portland_or_caruthers_brag.pdf.  
4. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39) (2006).  
5. Brownfields and Land Revitalization, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/index.html 
(last updated Sept. 26, 2014).  
6. Id.  
7. For more information on the impact of brownfields, see Infra. III.B. 
8. Id. 
9. EPA.GOV, supra, note 5. Some estimates put this number between 600,000 and 1,000,000. 
See S. REP. NO. 107-244, at 2 (2002). 
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and reuse of brownfields[.]”10 The amendments added an important 
provision that sought to protect certain parties from CERCLA liability, 
and became known as the Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser (BFPP) 
defense. This defense would shield against liability as a potentially 
responsible party (PRP) under CERCLA for developers acquiring 
contaminated real property after January 11, 2002.11 This defense requires 
the purported BFPP to establish eight criteria by a preponderance of the 
evidence.12  One of the BFPP defense’s eight criteria requires showing an 
exercise of “appropriate care with … hazardous substances … by taking 
reasonable steps to” stop additional releases of hazardous substances, and 
preventing or limiting exposure of the hazardous substances to humans, 
the environment, or natural resources after acquiring the property.13   
 Prior to the amendments, the main defense against PRP liability was 
for a party to claim status as an innocent landowner.14 This defense 
required the party to show an exercise of “due care” by a preponderance 
of the evidence with respect to the release or threat of release of any 
hazardous substance.15 There was little to no explanation at the time of the 
Amendments as to whether “appropriate care” and “due care” impose 
different standards of care. 
 In 2013, the Fourth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to 
interpret the scope of “appropriate care” under CERCLA’s BFPP defense 
in a reported case. The Court held in PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II that Ashley 
II, the current owner of a portion of a former fertilizer facility, failed to 
establish a BFPP defense for liability exemption.16 The Court affirmed the 
District Court’s holding that Ashley II was a PRP through its failure to 
establish a number of the eight criteria for the BFPP defense, including the 
exercise of appropriate care.17  In doing so, the Court rejected Ashley II’s 
argument that appropriate care was a lesser standard than due care. The 
Court speculated that appropriate care might even be a higher standard 
than due care, but ultimately held it to be at least as stringent as due care.18 
 The Fourth Circuit’s holding reflects a poor policy choice in light of 
the stated goals of the Brownfield Amendments. In order to incentivize the 
                                                 
10. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 
115 Stat. 236 (2002) (emphasis added).  
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r)(1) (2002).  
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)-(H) (2002). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(D) (2002). 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2002). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2002). 
16. PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II, 714 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2013). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
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redevelopment of brownfields, the Environmental Protection Agency, or 
Congress, should redefine the standard of care as one that imposes less 
stringent duties on the prospective purchaser than due care. Appropriate 
care should require the party asserting the BFPP defense to take the 
minimal steps necessary to prevent imminent releases, cut off exposure 
pathways, and stabilize existing conditions when these modest, immediate 
measures could prevent the conditions from worsening. An appropriate 
care standard that is less stringent than due care better effectuates the 
policy goals of the Amendments and redevelopment of contaminated 
properties in general. A lower standard for appropriate care is also 
reflective of the quasi-utilitarian approach of many federal environmental 
statutes.   
 If no action is taken to change the standard for imposing liability, 
developers may be less inclined to undertake voluntary redevelopment of 
contaminated properties if the risk of becoming liable as a PRP is uncertain 
and not well defined.19 A different standard can act as yet another tool to 
encourage private developers to take on redevelopment of brownfields 
and, consequently, can provide economic benefits to the local community, 
help reduce urban blight and urban sprawl, and protect greenfields.20 For 
the foregoing reasons, the better policy choice for promoting 
redevelopment of brownfields, and consequently lowering the brownfield 
inventory, is a duty of care that is less than the due care standard under 
CERCLA. 
 First, a brief discussion of PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II will be used as 
an entry point to examine the appropriate care standard under the BFPP 
defense in CERCLA. Second, background on CERCLA liability schemes 
and the Brownfields Amendments will be provided. Third, an argument 
will be made in support of a lesser standard for appropriate care using the 
history of the Brownfields Program and the Amendments, the need to 
incentivize development of brownfields, and how a different standard is 
harmonious with other environmental statutes in the United States. Along 
with that discussion, limitations to this proposal’s incentivizing of 
brownfields development will also be discussed. Finally, this paper will 
address counterarguments to this new, proposed standard of care. 
                                                 
19. That party would lack knowledge sufficient to know the extent and thoroughness of cleanup 
it must conduct at each stage of the redevelopment after acquisition of the facility.  
20. A “greenfield” is simply land that is undeveloped. Unlike a brownfield, greenfield 
development occurs on undeveloped land. See Greenfield, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/greenfield (last visited October 25, 2014).   
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II. THE CASE: PCS NITROGEN V. ASHLEY II 
 In PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II, the Fourth Circuit became the first 
federal court to interpret the scope of “appropriate care” under the BFPP 
defense. Understandably, developers and environmental lawyers watched 
this case closely because of the liability ramifications.21    
 The case involved the current site owner, Ashley II (Ashley), 
bringing a cost recovery action against PCS Nitrogen, Inc. for costs it 
incurred in hazardous waste cleanup at a former fertilizer-manufacturing 
site.22 It was not disputed that Ashley incurred cleanup costs of hazardous 
substances.23  The two parties disputed which one was liable as potentially 
responsible parties (PRP) for cleanup costs of the hazardous wastes at the 
site.24 The district court, in a bifurcated trial, held PCS Nitrogen as a PRP 
in the first trial.25 Along with other parties, Ashley was also found liable 
as a PRP and was allocated a portion of the response costs.26 Ashley 
appealed the ruling. 
 At the first trial, the district court found that Ashley failed to establish 
a number of the eight required criteria for the defense.27  The district court 
held that Ashley’s failure to clean, fill, and cap sumps as well as remove, 
monitor, or adequately address certain debris resulting from the demolition 
of structures on site did not constitute “appropriate care.”28 Ashley’s own 
expert admitted that the sumps should have been filled a year before they 
actually were, and this delay was not the action that a “similarly situated 
reasonable and prudent person would have taken.”29 
 On appeal, the Court reviewed Ashley’s BFPP defense. In particular, 
the issue of whether Ashley exercised “appropriate care with respect to 
hazardous substances found at the facility by taking reasonable steps to (i) 
stop any continuing release; (ii) prevent any threatened future release; and 
                                                 
21. 4th Circuit Hears Oral Argument on Ashley II Case, SCHNAPF LLC (Jan. 4, 2013), 
www.environmental-law.net/2013/01/4th-circuit-hears-oral-argument-on-ashley-ii-case/. 
22. PCS Nitrogen v. Ashley II, 714 F.3d 161, 167 (4th Cir. 2013) [hereafter, “Ashley II”]. 
23. Id. at 172.  
24. Id. at 167. 
25. Id.  The original operator of the ammonia and fertilizer plant at the site was Columbia 
Nitrogen Corporation (“Old CNC”).  “New CNC” was a corporation that purchased the plant on June 
30, 1966.  PCS Nitrogen, through a series of mergers and acquisitions, was a successor to New CNC.  
PCS Nitrogen was a PRP by virtue of being a successor to New CNC.  Id. at 169-73. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 180-81. 
28. Id. at 180. 
29. Id. at 181 (citing New York v. Lashins Arcade Co., 91 F.3d 353, 361 (2nd Cir. 1996) 
(deciding whether a party “took all precautions with respect to the particular waste that a similarly 
situated reasonable and prudent person would have taken in light of all relevant facts and 
circumstances.”)). 
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(iii) prevent or limit human, environmental, or natural resource exposure 
to any previously released hazardous substance.”30 Ashley reiterated the 
argument presented at trial that courts should apply a lesser standard of 
care under appropriate care than due care.31 Ashley supported its 
contention based on the purposes of the Brownfields Amendments, which 
was to promote voluntary cleanup of contaminated property.32 Ashley 
argued that “landowners will not undertake voluntary brownfields 
redevelopment for fear of becoming fully liable for cleanup costs as a 
result of minor mistakes that may not even contribute to harm at the 
facility.”33   
 In the end, the Court rejected Ashley’s argument and upheld the 
District Court’s ruling. The Court’s reasoning compared the “reasonable 
steps” requirement found in both the innocent landowner defense and the 
BFPP defense.34 The Court, relying on an Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) guidance document, held that appropriate care was at least 
as stringent as due care.35 According to the EPA guidance, the “reasonable 
steps” required under appropriate care is “consonant with traditional 
common law principles and the existing CERCLA ‘due care’ 
requirements.”36 These “reasonable steps,” according to the Court, 
required Ashley to fill the sumps earlier than it did in order to “prevent any 
threatened future release.”37 
 Interestingly, the Court speculated that the BFPP appropriate care 
mandate might require a higher standard of care than due care under the 
innocent landowner defense.38 Logic, the Court reasoned, would suggest 
that a landowner or developer acquiring property that is known to be 
contaminated with hazardous substances should be held to a higher 
standard of care.39 By contrast, an innocent landowner, who, by definition, 
is not aware of the presence of hazardous substances prior to acquisition 
of the facility, should be held to the lower standard.40 
                                                 
30. Id. at 180 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(D) (2002)). 
31. Id. at 180. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id.  
35. Id. 
36. Id. (citing Interim Guidance Regarding Criteria Landowners Must Meet in Order to Qualify 
for Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser, Contiguous Property Owner, or Innocent Landowner 
Limitations on CERCLA Liability, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Mar. 6, 2003), 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/common-elem-guide.pdf.  
37. Supra note 22, at 181. 
38. Id. at 180. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
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 While the Court likely reached the correct holding in light of EPA 
guidance and the facts of the case41, a standard for appropriate care that is 
more stringent than due care is inapposite to the purposes of the 
Brownfields Amendments and the BFPP defense.42 Ashley correctly notes 
that a higher standard of care, or simply a lack of clear limits on what 
implicates liability, undermines the goals of the Amendments and 
discourages redevelopment of brownfields.43 
III. CERCLA, THE BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM, AND THE BROWNFIELD 
AMENDMENTS 
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Li-
ability Act 
 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) provides a federal statutory mechanism for the 
response, cleanup, and imposition of liability for hazardous waste sites and 
emergency releases of hazardous substances.44 CERCLA permits the EPA 
and other entities to clean up sites and seek out PRPs for costs when the 
PRP either fails to clean up the contamination or cannot be located.45 
CERCLA imposes strict liability, joint and several.46 The legal 
classification of Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) covers a broad 
category of individuals, including an owner and operator of a facility and 
any person “who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arrange for disposal 
… of hazardous substances[.]”47  
 Ordinarily, a prospective purchaser with knowledge of the 
contamination is liable as a PRP once it acquires the property because it 
now owns or operates a contaminated facility (e.g., a brownfield). 
Additionally, under CERCLA’s strict liability scheme, the real estate 
                                                 
41. The District Court of South Carolina found that Ashley failed to establish by the 
preponderance of the evidence another of the eight criteria for the BFPP defense.  Specifically, Ashley 
did not show sufficient evidence that no disposals occurred at the site after Ashley’s acquisition of the 
facility.  See Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PC Nitrogen, Inc., 791 F. Supp.2d 431, 499 (D.S.C. 
2011). 
42. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 
115 Stat. 236 (2002). 
43. Ashley II, 714 F.3d at 167. 
44. Summary of CERCLA (Superfund), EPA.GOV, (Mar. 16, 2014), www.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/summary-comprehensive-environmental-response-compensation-and-liability-act; 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9614 (1980). 
45. Id. 
46. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988). 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1991). 
32 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 5:1 
 
transaction through which the BFPP acquires the brownfield may 
constitute a “contract” by which the purchaser becomes a PRP. 
B. The Brownfields Program: pre-Amendments 
 The EPA Brownfields Program started in 1995 as a means to 
“empower states, communities, and other stakeholders in economic 
redevelopment to work together in a timely manner to prevent, assess, 
safely clean up, and sustainably reuse brownfields.”48 The EPA sought to 
encourage brownfield development through a number of different 
mechanisms, including providing grant money to local governments.49 
Additionally, the EPA sought to encourage private development through 
the use of Prospective Purchaser Agreements (PPAs).50 The PPAs were 
negotiated between the agency and private parties and included a covenant 
not to sue the prospective purchaser of the brownfield.51 Without a PPA, 
a private developer risked liability through a number of ways, including 
merely being an owner or a party to a real estate transaction.52 CERCLA’s 
uncertain liability scheme is recognized as a major deterrent to potential 
investors in brownfields.53 The PPAs were criticized as being ineffective 
and cumbersome because they were subject to public comment and closely 
scrutinized by the EPA, thus leading to lengthy delays in finalization.54 
The PPAs were project-specific,55 thus tying up agency and developer 
resources for each proposed project.   
 However, PPAs were largely the only means by which a private 
developer could mitigate the disincentives and risks associated with 
                                                 
48. Basic Information, Brownfields and Land Revitalization, EPA.GOV, 
www.epa.gov/brownfields/basic_info.htm (last updated July 16, 2012). 
49. Id. 
50. Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers of 
Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34732, 34792-
34798 (July 3, 1995), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1995-07-03/pdf/95-16282.pdf. 
51. Id. 
52. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1991). 
53. Flannary P. Collins, The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act: 
A Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 303 (2003) (citing 147 CONG. REC. S3,879, S3,892 (daily 
ed. Apr. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Boxer)). 
54. Casey Cohn, The Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act: Landmark 
Reform or a “Trap for the Unwary”?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 672, 679-80 (2004).  See also Gregory 
D. Trimarche, Commentary, CERCLA’s New Prospective Purchaser Defense, 23 NO. 9 ANDREWS 
HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIG. REP. 12 (2002) (discussing a number of the criteria that was required 
before a PPA was approved, including a substantial likelihood of federal response at the site, the PPA 
had to result in a “substantial public benefit,” the development could not exacerbate any existing 
contamination, and others.). 
55. Gregory D. Trimarche, Commentary, CERCLA’s New Prospective Purchaser Defense, 23 
NO. 9 ANDREWS HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIG. REP. 12 (2002).  
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brownfield redevelopment.56 Without a PPA covenant not to sue, a private 
developer could become liable without contributing any contamination at 
the site.57 Consequently, these PPAs did not have the desired effect of 
increasing and incentivizing development of brownfields. Developers 
might, instead, seek to develop on greenfields.58  Greenfields 
development, in turn, increases urban sprawl and reduces tax revenues to 
the municipality.59 One author notes that this issue raises environmental 
justice concerns as well, due to the fact that abandoned or unused 
brownfields are usually located in economically depressed communities.60 
The EPA, faced with the administrative burden of negotiating PPAs and 
the desire to encourage brownfield redevelopment, supported legislative 
action to address these problems.61  
C. The Brownfields Amendments 
 In 2002, President Bush signed the Small Business and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act into law.62 The law’s purpose is to “provide certain 
relief for small businesses from liability under [CERCLA], and to amend 
such Act to promote the cleanup and reuse of brownfields[.]”63 This law 
amended portions of CERCLA, and notably, clarified certain liability 
defenses, including the addition of the BFPP liability defense.64   
 The Senate, in committee discussions on the proposed amendment, 
reported general findings of fact that included estimates of between 
600,000 and 1,000,000 brownfield sites in the U.S.65 Greenfields faced 
increased development pressures in rural areas as prospective purchasers 
sought to avoid CERCLA liability associated with brownfields.66 The 
presence of brownfields in urban areas causes blight and increased 
                                                 
56. Collins, supra note 53, at 309. 
57. Id. 
58. Collins, supra note 53, at 303. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. (discussing the problem of “mothballing” properties, i.e., leaving sites unremediated). 
61. See infra Part IV.B.  See also Trimarche, supra note 55 (stating that “To a large extent, the 
new prospective purchaser defense is simply an outgrowth of the EPA’s old administrative policy on 
prospective purchaser agreements… as anyone who has negotiated a PPA can attest, these project-
specific PPAs were quite cumbersome to negotiate, and often created as many problems as they 
solved”). 
62. Laws & Statutes, Brownfields, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/laws/index.htm 
(last updated July 16, 2012); Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. 
L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).   
63. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 
115 Stat. 2356 (2002) (emphasis added). 
64. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40) (2002), 9607(q)(1)(C) (2002). 
65. S. REP. NO. 107-244, at 2 (2002). 
66. Id. 
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environmental and human health risks in those communities, especially 
those that were already disproportionately affected.67 The Senate sought 
to encourage brownfields development because it recognized the benefits 
to local communities, such as utilizing already-existing city infrastructure, 
adding to the local tax base, attracting new businesses and jobs, and 
relieving the development pressures on greenfields.68 Additionally, the 
Senate specifically noted that developers avoid brownfields, including 
“abandoned sites, even those with little or no contamination,” because the 
risk of being held liable for the full cost of the remediation under CERCLA 
exceeded the property value of the site.69   
 The BFPP liability defense permits a developer to knowingly 
purchase a contaminated facility while avoiding liability as a PRP, 
provided the developer acquires the facility after January 11, 2002 and the 
BFPP establishes eight criteria by a preponderance of the evidence.70 This 
is a defense against any action for cost recovery by any other PRP, given 
the strict, joint and several liability nature of CERCLA. The BFPP defense 
was largely considered “an outgrowth of the EPA’s old administrative 
policy on [PPAs].”71 
 Prior to the amendments, if a PPA was not secured, the main defense 
against CERCLA liability was the innocent landowner defense.72 
However, a brownfield by definition is a contaminated site, and, thus, this 
defense was of no use to a developer who wished to voluntarily develop a 
brownfield. The innocent landowner defense, as opposed to the BFPP 
defense, requires the party claiming the defense to exercise due care with 
regard to the release of hazardous substances caused by “an act or 
omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the defendant 
… taking into consideration the characteristics” of said substance “in light 
of all relevant facts and circumstances.”73   
 The addition of the BFPP defense created another means by which a 
developer or landowner could avoid CERCLA liability. However, the use 
                                                 
67. S. REP. NO. 107-2, at 1-2 (2001)(disproportionately affected communities implicate 
environmental justice issues).  
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)-(H) (2002); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(1)(C) (2002). The BFPP defense, 
of course, is only raised if and when another party brings a cost recovery action against the prospective 
purchaser under CERCLA. 
71. Trimarche, supra note 55. 
72. See generally Keith H. Johnson, Overview of the Small Business Liability Relief and 
Brownfields Revitalization Act, P.S. Publications (Jan. 1, 2004), available at 
http://www.poynerspruill.com/publications/pages/overviewofthesmallbusinessliabilityreliefandbrow
nfieldsrevitalizationact.aspx. 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2002). 
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of appropriate care within the BFPP defense caused some confusion 
among attorneys and developers.74 Initial speculation ran from appropriate 
care imposing a higher standard of care than due care, to a lower standard 
of care. This uncertainty regarding the level of care required under 
“appropriate care” only increased uncertainty surrounding potential 
liability under CERCLA.75 
 If developers believed that appropriate care would require a higher 
standard of care than due care, or if appropriate care was an uncertain 
standard, then logically they would continue to rely on PPAs, even if they 
were cumbersome. At the very least, a PPA guaranteed protection from 
CERCLA liability. Appropriate care, at the time of the Amendments and 
for some time thereafter, was an unknown variable for prospective 
purchasers. 
 The EPA issued guidance on the Amendments, relied on by the 
Fourth Circuit in Ashley II76, that sought to clarify the BFPP, innocent 
landowners, and contiguous property owner limitations on liability.77 The 
guidance recognized congressional intent to incentivize owners of 
contaminated property by providing additional defenses to CERCLA 
liability.78 By “acting responsibly” in the presence of hazardous 
substances, certain owners could avoid placement into the PRP pool.79 It 
is odd then that, according to the EPA, this liability defense does nothing 
more than adopt already existing “due care” principles. The only 
meaningful difference between these two guidelines is that the BFPP 
knows the property is contaminated prior to purchase, and the innocent 
landowner does not, despite exercising due diligence prior to acquisition.  
  However, even with EPA guidance, the scope of appropriate care 
was still largely unknown as no federal court made a definitive ruling on 
it prior to the Fourth Circuit in Ashley II.80 
 
                                                 
74. Cohn, supra note 54, at 699. 
75. Collins, supra note 53, at 323. 
76. Ashley II, 714 F.3d at 180; Supra note 36. 
77. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Interim Guidance Regarding Criteria Landowners Must Meet 
in Order to Qualify for Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser, Contiguous Property Owner, or Innocent 




80. Although, I would argue that Ashley II did not reach a definitive ruling on the level of care 
required because the facts relied upon by Ashley to establish the BFPP defense were unfavorable.  
Namely, Ashley’s own expert’s admittance that sumps should have been filled in a year before it was 
actually done.  See supra note 30. 
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IV. THE NEED FOR CLARITY: LOWERING THE STANDARD OF CARE FOR 
BFPPS 
 The EPA, or Congress, should redefine the standard for appropriate 
care as one that imposes less stringent duties on the prospective purchaser 
than due care. This lesser standard of care is consistent with the purpose 
of the 2002 amendments, helps to incentivize private development of 
brownfields, and reflects the quasi-utilitarian nature of many federal 
environmental statutes. This lower standard will ease pressure on 
greenfield development while continuing to promote the benefits of the 
Brownfields Program. 
A.  New Standard for Appropriate Care 
 Appropriate care should be a lower standard than due care under the 
Brownfields Amendments and CERCLA. At the very least, a defined and 
clear standard of care provides some certainty in the risky area of private 
brownfield development and makes an important distinction between the 
two standards of care cited within CERCLA. Appropriate care should 
require a property owner (i.e., the prospective purchaser) to take the 
minimal steps necessary to prevent imminent releases, cut off exposure 
pathways, and stabilize existing conditions when these modest, immediate 
measures could prevent exacerbation of hazardous conditions. This level 
of care would require parties claiming the BFPP defense to show by the 
preponderance of the evidence that they did not make the situation worse, 
while not necessarily requiring them to conduct a full-scale cleanup at the 
initial stages of remediation and development. Alternately, appropriate 
care should require the prospective purchaser to adhere to the performance 
mandates as dictated by a relevant state agency.81 The relevant state 
agency would establish performance mandates that the prospective 
purchaser must follow in order to receive liability protection. 
 In 3000 E. Imperial, LLC v. Robertshaw Controls Co., the U.S 
District Court for the Central District of California addressed the question 
of whether the plaintiff exercised appropriate care as a BFPP when the 
defendant, asserting that the plaintiff was a PRP, brought a counterclaim 
for cost recovery.82 In that case, the plaintiff worked with the California 
Department of Toxic Substances (DTSC) on a coordinated voluntary 
cleanup of a contaminated property purchased by the plaintiff in 2006.83 
                                                 
81. An example is provided in the case discussion that follows this paragraph. 
82. 3000 E. Imperial, LLC v. Robertshaw Controls Co., CV 08-3985 PA EX, 2010 WL 5464296 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2010). 
83. Id. at 1, 11. 
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The property was a former manufacturing site with underground storage 
tanks (USTs).84 The plaintiff knew the site was contaminated prior to 
purchase.85 An environmental consulting firm that was hired by the 
plaintiff to investigate the contamination concluded that the groundwater 
was contaminated.86 The Court recognized that the California Health and 
Safety Code mirrored CERLCA’s BFPP definition.87 However, the 
California statute defined “appropriate care” as merely requiring a BFPP 
to adhere to the response actions directed by DTSC—a narrower 
requirement.88   
 In 300 E. Imperial, the issue was whether the plaintiff’s two-year 
delay in removing the USTs was “unreasonable” and, thus, violative of 
“appropriate care.”89 The Court found that draining the USTs of 
contaminants was a “reasonable step” towards stopping any continuing 
leak and preventing future leaks.90 The defendant, Whittaker Corporation, 
argued that the USTs should have been excavated after draining in order 
to prevent “surface water infiltration.”91 The Court held that it was not 
“unreasonable,” as the defendant urged, for the plaintiff to leave the USTs 
in the ground for upwards of two years.92 The plaintiff was entitled to the 
BFPP liability defense because the sampling and draining of the USTs 
constituted “appropriate care.” 
 Applying the Court’s analysis in the 3000 E. Imperial, LLC case to 
the Ashley II case, it is arguable that the exercise of appropriate care would 
merely require Ashley to take reasonable steps to prevent the sumps from 
leeching and ensuring that the debris did not leave the premises. Ashley 
could simply take minimal steps to control or contain the storm-water 
filled sumps, rather than conduct a full remediation as could be required 
under due care. Appropriate care, under the proposed standard, would 
require Ashley to not make the situation worse, but the standard will not 
go so far as to demand full remediation at the initial stages of 
redevelopment. In 3000 E. Imperial, LLC, the plaintiff conducted the 
necessary environmental investigation upon acquiring the site, and drained 
the USTs. The plaintiff did not immediately or within the first year remove 
the USTs from underground. Similarly, Ashley, under the proposed 
                                                 
84. Id. at 1. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 11. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 12. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
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standard, could simply act to prevent contaminated sump water from 
leeching or spilling during the initial stages of redevelopment and keep 
debris from spreading. By preventing the conditions at the site from 
significantly deteriorating, Ashley would avoid PRP liability. 
B. The Purpose of the Amendments 
 The proposed lesser standard for appropriate care also finds some 
support in the legislative history leading up to the enacting of the 
Brownfields Amendments. First, the very purpose of the Amendments was 
to “promote the cleanup and reuse of brownfields.”93 The EPA supported 
the Amendments because, presumably, the new BFPP defense would 
eliminate or reduce the need for PPAs, which were burdensome and 
ineffective for encouraging rapid development of brownfields.94 If a 
private developer was choosing between a BFPP defense, which the 
Fourth Circuit held to require the same level of care as due care, and a 
PPA, which, although cumbersome to negotiate, guarantees liability 
defense, logic and rational business judgment would dictate selecting the 
latter.  This result defeats the very purpose of the BFPP defense. 
 Evidence prior to the adoption of the Brownfields Amendments 
suggests that a lower standard of care was envisioned. Gregory 
Trimarche—an attorney specializing in brownfields transactions and 
environmental litigation as well as writing about the Amendments—
reported on discussions he had with a “senior EPA official.”95 The official 
“indicated a belief that the new appropriate-care standard should be read 
simply as requiring the new owner to take the minimal steps necessary to 
prevent imminent releases, cut off exposure pathways, and stabilize 
existing conditions when modest, immediate measures could prevent” an 
exacerbation of the contamination.96 Trimarche’s interpretation was that 
appropriate care could be read to merely require preventing “a bad 
situation from becoming worse.”97 Indeed, for some time preceding the 
Amendments, there appeared to be a few legislators willing to wholly 
exempt prospective purchasers from any CERCLA liability.98 
                                                 
93. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 
115 Stat. 2356 (2002).   




98. See 141 CONG. REC. E1623 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1995) (statement of Rep. Robert Borski) (“The 
bill also includes protection for prospective purchasers—people who want to buy property but may be 
scared away by the potential liability.  Under this bill, prospective purchasers who have no connection 
with the waste disposal will be shielded from liability.”); 141 CONG. REC. E1622 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 
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 The EPA’s March 6, 2003 guidance on the new CERCLA liability 
defenses interprets the “reasonable steps” required of contiguous 
landowners, BFPPs, and innocent landowners as “consonant with 
traditional common law principles and the existing CERCLA ‘due care’ 
requirement.”99 However, according to the EPA, these “reasonable steps” 
may differ depending on the type of liability defense asserted.100 EPA 
describes these “reasonable steps” as reflecting the balance Congress 
sought between liability protection for types of landowners and protection 
of human health and the environment.101 Additionally, the EPA noted that 
“due care” under the pre-Brownfields Amendments CERCLA liability 
differs from the “reasonable steps” required under the Brownfields 
Amendments.102 “Due care,” according to the EPA, is a “reference point 
for evaluating the reasonable steps requirement.”103 
 The purported goals of the Amendments were, in part, to encourage 
development of brownfields and alleviate the fear of CERCLA liability.104 
The EPA guidance indicates a lack of clearly defined steps for the standard 
of care required under the Brownfields Amendments. Instead, whether 
“due care” or “appropriate care,” a private developer105 may only rely on 
reference points as to what “reasonable steps” it must take in the presence 
of hazardous substances. One can imagine the scenario in which a private 
developer takes what it believes to be appropriate “reasonable steps” only 
                                                 
1995) (statement of Rep. Richard Gephardt) (“…this legislation provides protection for good faith 
prospective purchasers…Under Superfund, the owner of a contaminated tract of land may be held 
responsible for cleaning it up even if the pollution was created by the prior owner. Thus, potential 
purchasers are often deterred from investing in sites with potential contamination.  This provision 
allows a purchaser who checks the site carefully before purchase to avoid liability…”) [Rep. Gephardt 
discusses both “good faith prospective purchasers” and “innocent landowners” and uses the terms 
somewhat interchangeably.]; Katherine X. Vasiliades, Encouraging Industry in Order to Preserve 
Non-Commercial Property, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 29, 53-55 (1988) (discussing Sen. Smith’s 
introduction of the Accelerated Cleanup and Environmental Restoration Act of 1995 “as a bill to 
reauthorize and amend CERCLA… the bill protected purchasers from liability provided the purchaser 
conducted satisfactory inquiries prior to purchaser of the property and did not exacerbate the 
contamination.”).   
99. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra, note 77.  
100. Id. (stating that “The reasonable steps determination will be a site-specific, fact-based 
inquiry.”). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. (“CERCLA requires the exercise of ‘due care with respect to the hazardous substances 
concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all the 
relevant facts and circumstances; CERCLA § 107(b)(3)(a).”). 
103. Id. 
104. S. REP. NO. 107-2, at 2 (2001). 
105. A private developer who was aware of the presence of hazardous substances would seek 
BFPP liability protection (“appropriate care”).  The innocent landowner liability defense would apply 
to the private developer that did not know of the presence of hazardous substances despite making the 
appropriate inquiries (“due care”). 
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to come under CERCLA liability as a PRP through a later “site-specific, 
fact-based inquiry,”106 thus providing no greater level of confidence for 
the private developer seeking to redevelop a brownfield.107 
C. Incentivizing Brownfields Development 
 A new, lower standard for appropriate care will incentivize 
development through the removal of a tricky variable within the 
brownfields development calculus. The Senate recognized that 
“abandoned sites, even those with little or no contamination” are left 
unremediated due to “fear that cleanup costs could exceed the property 
value [and] reduce incentives for redevelopment.”108 The potential high 
costs of cleanup, in addition to the fear of CERCLA liability, are “primary 
factors” that drive developers towards the less risky greenfields.109  The 
liability risks also prevent willing developers from obtaining necessary 
loans and insurance.110 
 By clearly defining the limits of appropriate care to be a lesser 
standard than due care, loan providers and insurers are provided a greater 
guarantee that the project is not likely to result in costly litigation and 
recovery costs. Additionally, developers are provided some assurance that 
voluntarily taking on a brownfield will not result in liability as long as they 
do not make the contamination worse. Certainly, it would be in the best 
interest of the developer to perform a full remediation prior to project 
completion. A new appropriate care standard can at least prevent costly 
liability during the initial stages of project development. 
D. Harmony with Other Federal Environmental Statutes 
 Lowering the burden for what qualifies as “appropriate care” for 
CERCLA liability is harmonious with many of the current federal 
environmental statutes. Statutory programs like the Clean Air Act (CAA) 
and the Clean Water Act (CWA) reflect a quasi-utilitarian approach to 
environmental problems. Utilitarianism is a philosophy that provides, in 
basic terms, that the “morally good action is one that helps the greatest 
                                                 
106. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra, note 77 (stating that “The reasonable steps 
determination will be a site-specific, fact-based inquiry.”). 
107. Frank B. Cross, Bona fide prospective purchaser exemption, 1 Fed. ENVIR. REG. OF REAL 
ESTATE § 2:51 (2014) (“…what constitutes due care for purposes of the [BFPP] exemption will 
likewise require a case-by-case analysis of the particular facts and circumstances.”). 
108. S. REP. NO. 107-2, at 2 (2001). 
109. Id.  
110. Id. at 2-3. 
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number of people.”111 In other words, an action is proper when the 
consequences of that action benefit the greatest number of people. 
Utilitarianism can be described, in the context of environmental 
regulation, as a cost-benefit analysis in that weighs the cost of preventing 
pollution with the benefits to human health and the environment. The CAA 
and the CWA, two major federal environmental statutes, illustrate this 
cost-benefit analysis. 
 The CAA, in part, regulates the emissions of air pollutants from 
stationary and mobile sources.112 The CAA does not, however, prohibit all 
emissions of air pollutants. Rather, sources of air pollutants must comply 
with the CAA by obtaining permits, which set the effective emissions 
limits for that source.113 Part C of the CAA requires a preconstruction 
permit for a proposed facility to be subject to the best available control 
technology (BACT) for regulated air pollutants.114 The EPA, or other 
permitting authority, sets BACT on a case-by-case basis by considering 
“energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs…”115 Best 
available control technology explicitly mandates a type of cost-benefit 
analysis. The statute does not require the most stringent emissions limit 
technology. Rather, it only requires that the permitting authority set the 
BACT for each applicant by weighing environmental and economic 
impacts along with other costs. The CAA reflects a conscious decision by 
policymakers to incorporate a cost-benefit analysis in determining 
emissions limitations, rather than a broad, strict standard of care. 
 The CWA, by regulating the effluent emission into waterways, also 
implements a similar permitting program for discrete, point sources.116 
The CWA, like the CAA, does not prohibit all pollution. It only sets 
emissions limits for pollution sources. The National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) allows the EPA to issue permits for the 
discharge of any pollutant, provided certain conditions are met.117 The 
NPDES permitting program does not prohibit any pollutant discharge. 
Rather, it permits some if other certain statutory conditions are met.   
                                                 
111. Utilitarianism definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/utilitarianism (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (1970). 
113. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality, 42 U.S.C. § 7470-7479 (1977); 
Plan Requirements for Nonattainment Areas, 42 U.S.C. § 7501-7509(a) (1977); and Title V Permits, 
42 U.S.C. § 7661-7661(f) (1990). 
114. 42 U.S.C.§ 7475(a)(4) (1977).  
115. 42 U.S.C. §7479 (C)(3) (1977) (emphasis added). 
116. See generally, Summary of the Clean Water Act, EPA.GOV, http://www2.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/summary-clean-water-act (last updated Mar. 16, 2014). 
117. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1972). 
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 Relatedly, the Supreme Court ruled that the EPA is permitted to 
conduct a cost-benefit analysis for regulations promulgated under § 1326 
of the CWA.118 In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, petitioners challenged 
EPA regulations that “permit the issuance of site-specific variances from 
national performance standards if a facility can demonstrate either that the 
costs of compliance are ‘significantly greater than’ the costs considered by 
the agency in setting the standards, or that the costs of compliance ‘would 
be significantly greater than the benefits of complying with the applicable 
performance standards.’”119 The EPA’s regulations, upheld by the Court, 
were based on its interpretation that the statutory requirement of “best 
technology available” permitted consideration of technology cost against 
the environmental benefits produced.120 The EPA did not have to select 
the “best technology available” based only on the environmental benefits 
produced. It was permitted to weigh those environmental benefits against 
the costs to the facility. 
 Similarly, lowering the standard of care under appropriate care for 
BFPPs reflects a policy choice: weighing the benefits of further 
incentivizing brownfields against the potential human health and 
environmental risks associated with implementing the new standard. 
Namely, the risks of orphaned brownfields for which there are no PRPs 
available for cost recovery, and the delays in full remediation at the site 
are weighed against the harms of leaving a brownfield site unclaimed and 
undeveloped.  The reported rationale underlying the Amendments121 is 
weighed against the risks of implementing the new standard. If brownfield 
development is important, then other development incentives should be 
considered. The benefits of increased brownfields development122 
outweigh the risks of harm stemming from the lowered standard.   
D. The Limitations 
 Of course, lowering the standard of care for BFPPs may not result in 
any increase in brownfields development. After all, a BFPP defense 
requires a prospective purchaser to establish eight criteria by the 
preponderance of the evidence.123 Simply changing one criterion will not 
prevent a developer from becoming liable under CERCLA. Further, a 
prospective purchaser voluntarily acquires a contaminated site. A new 
                                                 
118. Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009). 
119. Id. at 216. 
120. Id. at 217-18. 
121. See supra Part IV.B. 
122. See supra Part III.C. 
123. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)-(H) (2002). 
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appropriate care standard may not affect the cost-risk calculation for the 
developer, especially when the developer would still conduct a full 
cleanup as a prudent business practice or still seek a PPA. Finally, there 
are many other variables that could affect brownfields development, 
including loan and insurance availability, profit projections, and other 
standard business considerations. 
V. CRITIQUES   
 Many criticisms likely exist towards this development-developer 
friendly approach for brownfields redevelopment. There are many more 
than were contemplated or that can be addressed in this article.  However, 
I will attempt to counter a few notable criticisms of this suggested 
approach. 
 One question that may arise is what justifies the different treatment 
of innocent landowners and BFPPs. An innocent landowner, by definition, 
does not cause or contribute to the contamination, nor does the innocent 
landowner know of the presence of hazardous substances.124 The 
difference in treatment is easily resolved if the purpose of the lower 
standard of care under appropriate care is to encourage developers to 
knowingly take on brownfields development. The reward for voluntarily 
acquiring brownfields is that the developer is less likely to become a PRP 
absent some egregious or patently deficient action. The prospective 
purchaser knows it is purchasing a brownfield125 and will, as any prudent 
business or person would do, ensure a full remediation by the end of the 
project. Prior to completion of the project, liability should not attach nor 
should the developer be compelled to assert the defense. An innocent 
landowner may have no intention of conducting a redevelopment or full 
remediation of the site.126 The prospective purchaser, conversely, knows 
the site is contaminated and should not face the penalty of becoming a PRP 
unless and until the project is completed. 
 Some may argue that lowering the standard of care would reward 
potentially substandard remediation efforts. However, the lesser standard 
under appropriate care would not provide a developer with complete 
protection from liability. For example, a developer who purchases a 
brownfield but does not take the modest or minimal steps necessary to 
prevent the spread of hazardous substances would receive no protection 
against PRP liability even under the new standard. This type of action is 
                                                 
124. See supra note 70. 
125. Which is, by definition, contaminated with hazardous substances. 
126. This is inherent in the definition of the innocent landowner defense. 
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akin to taking no action. Further, a developer faces other avenues of 
liability even if the standard of care is lowered. First, as was the case in 
Ashley II, Ashley failed to establish all of the eight criteria required for the 
BFPP defense.127 Even if Ashley exercised appropriate care under a lower 
standard, it failed to establish all of the BFPP criteria by a preponderance 
of the evidence.128 A lesser standard of appropriate care does not equate 
to no liability under the BFPP defense. Second, a developer may still face 
toxic tort liability129, any state hazardous waste laws, or liability under the 
Resource, Conservation, and Recovery Act (RCRA) citizen suit provision, 
amongst others.130 
 One final hurdle towards implementing a lesser standard is the 
informal EPA practice of preferring “one man left standing” for 
brownfields,131 which seeks to ensure that the present site owner, or some 
party, will perform a full remediation rather than leaving the site 
orphaned.132 Providing a means for avoiding liability to purchasers may 
leave brownfields without a known PRP.133 This should be of little 
concern if the goal of the Amendments is to promote the reuse of 
brownfields. A prospective purchaser taking on a brownfield would ensure 
that full cleanup at the site would occur prior to project completion or 
engaging in a subsequent real estate transaction to prevent PRP liability.134 
Consequently, there should be less incentive by the EPA to seek out other 
parties for recovery costs. 
                                                 
127. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)-(H) (2002) (listing the criteria as follows: whether all disposals of 
hazardous substances occurred before acquisition; performing all appropriate inquiries; making all 
legally required notices; exercising appropriate care; providing full cooperation, assistance and access 
to authorized response persons; compliance with land use restrictions and to not impede any 
institutional control at the site; compliance with requests and subpoenas; and having no affiliation with 
a PRP). 
128. Ashley II of Charleston, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc., 791 F. Supp.2d 431, 499 (D.S.C. 2011) 
(Ashley failed to show that no disposals occurred on the site after Ashley’s acquisition). 
129. A common law claim.  See generally N. Kathleen Strickland, Toxic Torts: An Overview, 
GP SOLO LAW TRENDS & NEWS REAL ESTATE (May 2005), www.americanbar.org/new 
sletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/toxictorts.html. 
130. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1980).  However, no action may be commenced if the Administrator or 
State has commenced a civil or criminal action against the alleged violator, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(B) 
(1980). 
131. Trimarche, supra note 55. 
132. Id. 
133. Of course, the BFPP defense is an affirmative one, protecting the site owner from suits from 
other PRPs for apportionment or contribution of cleanup fees.  It may be unlikely that removing the 
current owner from the PRP pool has any effect on other parties to recover for cleanup costs leaves a 
site truly orphaned, especially if the current owner does not have to assert the BFPP defense because 
no other party is seeking to recover cleanup costs against the purchaser. 
134. See supra Part III.A. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 Congress or the EPA should act to formally adopt a lower standard 
of care for appropriate care for BFPPs under the Brownfields 
Amendments. Appropriate care for BFPPs should impose a less stringent 
duty than traditional due care under CERCLA and the common law. 
Appropriate care should require that the property owner or developer take 
the minimal steps necessary to prevent imminent releases of hazardous 
substances, cut off exposure pathways, and stabilize existing condition 
when these modest, immediate measures could prevent a bad situation 
from becoming worse. In the alternative, appropriate care should be 
defined as following the performance standards and mandates required by 
the relevant state agency. 
 The Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Ashley II, that appropriate care is 
synonymous with due care, reflects a poor policy choice in light of the 
purpose of the Amendments. Granted, federal appellate courts are not 
where policy choices are made. This job is better left to the elected 
branches and to the administrative agencies charged with implementing 
federal statutes. 
 Congress, in the time leading up to the Amendments, recognized that 
private developers were not incentivized to voluntarily take on 
brownfields development. These private developers faced the risk of 
becoming liable as a PRP under CERCLA, even if only minimally 
contributing to the contamination. A lower standard of care can ease 
development pressures off less risky greenfields while still providing the 
many benefits associated with brownfields program. This new standard is 
also harmonious with the current quasi-utilitarian nature of federal 
environmental statutes. The benefits of brownfields redevelopment, 
including reducing urban blight and urban sprawl, as well as increasing 
the tax base for the local government, outweigh the interim risk of 
spreading or exacerbating hazardous contamination. After all, the prudent 
developer would still perform a full cleanup prior to project completion in 
order to avoid liability under toxic torts, state hazardous waste laws, and 
other environmental liability. The lower standard only guarantees that the 
private developer is less likely to become a PRP through any cost recovery 
actions during the initial redevelopment stages. 
 Finally, it is recognized that a lower standard of care is no panacea 
towards spurring brownfields development. There are many other 
variables at play that help to determine whether or not a private party will 
voluntarily take on a brownfield. Doing nothing only maintains the status 
quo and leaves urban centers blighted. A new standard is one way in which 
the scales can be tipped in favor of brownfields development. 
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